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The Question of Access to the Japanese Market1 
The question of access to the Japanese market has again become a central issue in 
the high politics of the relationship between the world's two largest economies. The 
settlement of the impasse over automobile and automobile parts trade (Hashimoto and 
Kantor, 28 June 1995) within the context of the Framework Agreement talks between the 
United States and Japan, has not resolved the issue — rather it underlines the continuing 
importance in American thinking of new trade policy strategies towards Japan and, 
perhaps, more broadly the whole of East Asia. 
Of course, Japan still has an agricultural sector which is among the most highly 
protected in the world, and Japanese agricultural protection for those commodities, like 
rice, the import of which is subject to quantitative restriction, rose rapidly over the last 
two decades of yen appreciation at a time when, otherwise, Japanese commercial policy 
was pointed towards trade liberalisation.2 
Restrictions on a whole range of service trades are also pervasive, from 
construction and civil aviation to legal services. These restrictions are a prime target of 
the stalled reform package introduced by former Prime Minister Hosokawa in 1993.3 
11 am grateful to John Kunkel for assembling all the bibliographical material on which this paper is 
based and for other assistance in its preparation. I am also grateful to Paul Sheard, Ross Garnaut, Ben 
Smith, Luke Gower, Tony Warren, Gordon de Brouwer, and Bill Norton for comments on a draft. I alone, 
of course, am responsible for the final form of the argument. 
2In this respect, Japan is, of course, only a front runner among the industrial country pack and even in 
agriculture, the liberalisation of the beef market in Japan after 1988 represents among the most significant 
agricultural trade liberalisations by any industrial country in recent times. At last, there is also a narrow 
opening in the rice market under the Japanese government's Uruguay Round commitments. 
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 Yet, in this sector too, the barriers are on the way down and, insofar as it is possible to devise 
objective measures of services trades affected by the regulatory system, Japan is not so far behind the 
United States in the openness of its services markets to foreign competition (see table below). 
The table provides a number of measures of the extent to which APEC economies have not committed to 
liberal trade under the GATS. The most important finding is that listed for all commitments. This is the 
average level of impediments for each country across all industries and all modes. The United States is 
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Ostensibly, Japan has the cleanest import system for manufactured goods among 
virtually all OECD countries: on average tariffs are lower and official non-tariff barriers 
have almost no effect on trade at all. Moreover, Japan, like Australia, is not a participant 
the most liberal in terms of this score, Japan is second and Australia is third. It is interesting to note that 
Japan is the most liberal in terms of market access, the US in terms of national treatment. 
Table 1 Measures of the Frequency of Application of Restrictions on Services Trade for 
APEC Countries a 
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in the Multi Fibres Arrangement (MFA) so that its market for the most important labour-
intensive exports from developing economies is more open than that of all other large 
industrial countries. Thus far, Japan has largely resisted the temptation of seeking 
'voluntary export restraint' on this sensitive area of manufactured goods trade. 
Paradoxically, it is in manufactured goods trade — the heartland of Japan's 
industrial competitiveness — that the question of access to the Japanese market now 
looms largest. There may be few official barriers to trade in manufactured goods, but the 
import share in Japanese markets is low in comparison with other industrial countries 
(Lawrence, 1987; Balassa and Noland, 1988) and it is frequently argued that non-official 
barriers limit access to the Japanese market for these goods. 'Hidden barriers' to trade, the 
argument runs, are endemic in Japanese corporate organisation and business structures 
and the 'peculiar' features of the Japanese market effectively exclude foreign competition. 
This survey focuses on the question of how market structure and different 
corporate organisational forms might affect access to the Japanese market for industrial 
goods. The question is how and whether keiretsu corporate structures in Japan constitute 
an important unofficial barrier in access to the Japanese market for manufactured goods. 
This is an important issue. 
The premise that 'hidden' barriers to trade explain Japan's low manufactured 
goods trade shares and international price differentials has gained currency in policy circles 
and come to provide a rationale for so called 'results-oriented' trade strategies. These 
including the application of Section 301 (of the 1974 United States Trade Act) (Robinson 
and Houghton, 1989) and attempts to set numerical import targets, sector by sector, for 
the volume of American goods that Japan and (potentially) other foreign countries are 
expected to buy (Passell, 1989; Altaian, 1994; Bergsten and Noland, 1993; Bhagwati, 
1994). 
The latest and most threatening expression of this thinking was in the contretemps 
between the United States and Japan over the American share of the Japanese automobile 
market (Kantor, 1995b; Clinton, 1995). 
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First, I review briefly the literature which contests the importance of Japanese 
barriers to trade in manufactured goods. Then, I explore the link between corporate 
structures and closed markets, identifying two analytically separate arguments which 
suggest that keiretsu corporate structures exclude foreign competition in the market for 
manufactures. Three types of keiretsu corporate structure are defined — financial keiretsu, 
vertical keiretsu, and distribution keiretsu. All are vertical organisational structures, in the 
sense of the literature on industrial organisation. I explore the argument that these 
structures are 'anti competitive' and that they constitute a 'hidden barrier' to trade. I draw 
attention to a study of Japanese investment in Australia which has been cited widely as 
evidence of the closedness of Japanese markets. Finally, I review the implications for 
policy. 
Many other facets of developments in trans-Pacific economic diplomacy are 
worthy of review — the macro-economic context which has brought the bilateral trade 
balance into sharp political focus in the United States; Japan's trade and current account 
surpluses, as a lightning rod for tensions in the management of the relationship with the 
United States; the dynamics of trade and foreign economic policy developments between 
Japan and the United States; the transition in the structure of economic power in Asia and 
the Pacific and its impact on policy substance and posture; the effect of these trends in 
trade policy between the two largest economic powers on the international trade policy 
environment. Some of these issues I have reviewed elsewhere (Drysdale, 1989). 
But understanding whether keiretsu corporate structures constitute a 'hidden 
barrier' to trade is central to assessment of the strength of the intellectual foundations, and 
therefore of the good sense, of the new trade policy strategies towards Japan. That is not 
to say, of course, that the strategies would have no impact even if they were premised on 
false intellectual foundations. As always, the question is whether they are likely to 
contribute to international welfare, not just redistribute income, for example, in favour of 
particular American producers and factors of production. There is also a broader scholarly 
interest in the effect of corporate organisational structures on the nature and operation of 
4 
international markets — a big question which is illuminated somewhat, but is not in the 
spotlight of attention in the literature surveyed here. 
Barriers to trade in manufactures 
A number of studies have explored the low propensity in Japan to import 
manufactured goods and sought to confirm the contention that Japanese institutions, or 
reliance on a variety of informal barriers to trade is its cause (Balassa, 1986; Lawrence, 
1987; Balassa and Noland, 1988; Krugman, 1991; Lawrence, 1991a; Fung, 1991; 
Lawrence, 1991b; Bergsten and Noland, 1993). These studies compare Japan's imports of 
manufactured goods with those of other industrial countries and conclude that Japan is an 
'outlier', with a lower share of manufactured goods imports and intra-industry trade in this 
sector. On the other hand, evidence provided by other studies of Japan's trade dependence 
and trade structure, such as those of Saxonhouse (1986), Saxonhouse (1988, esp. p.240), 
Saxonhouse and Stern (1989), Goto, F (1991), Weinstein and Yafeh (1993), and 
Saxonhouse (1993) suggests that there is no significant difference between Japan's trade 
structure and that of other industrial countries, when account is taken of cross-national 
differences in factor endowments, including capital, labour and a variety of natural 
resources, as well as distance in the international marketplace. 
Sazanami, Urata and Kawai (1995) attempt to overcome the problems associated 
with 'indirect' assessment of the barriers to Japanese imports of manufactured goods by 
measuring directly the price wedge between Japanese products and similar imported 
goods. There have been other price comparison studies but they are far less rigorous (US 
Department of Commerce and Japan Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1989). 
Very few countries collect data that allow ex-factory prices to be compared directly with 
the import prices of 'comparable' products at the required level of disaggregation; Japan is 
one of them. Unit value (price) differences are assumed to reflect the effect of official 
barriers to trade — which are measurable or observable — or non-official 'hidden' 
barriers to trade. Studies of differentials over time would be more robust to this criterion. 
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Although Sazanami, Urata and Kawai (1995, p. 14) exclude 26 product categories 
(among them automobiles) from their study because of product heterogeneity revealed in 
sensitivity analysis of the data, their findings reveal large differentials in the prices of 
'comparable' domestically produced and imported products. These differentials reflect 
official barriers to trade (272.5 per cent for the food and beverages product category) but, 
in other cases are not satisfactorily explainable by official barriers to trade (34.5 per cent 
for cotton yarn and 282.2 per cent for clothing) and are attributed to 'hidden' or non-
official barriers to trade. While the authors are careful not to attribute these measured 
price differences to Japanese corporate practices, their evidence has been used with less 
caution to support the interpretation that corporate practices in Japan are their cause 
(Bergsten and Noland, 1993, pp. 279-297). 
There are two significant problems with this study, despite its being the most 
comprehensive and rigorous of its kind thus far. First, as Sazanami, Urata, and Kawai 
admit (1995, p. 12), there is a real question about whether like is being compared with like 
in the price comparisons. Take the case of clothing product price comparisons. There are 
substantial quality differences between clothing made in Japan and imported clothing from 
China and other developing economies (which constitute the bulk of imports in this 
category). Imports service a different segment of the market for clothing from Japanese 
made clothing. The price differential for this product category is not a credible measure of 
the difference in price of the same goods produced domestically and produced abroad. 
Even for foodstuffs, the problem of matching product categories is serious: 12 canned and 
bottled Japanese products are 'matched' with 42 imported items (p.8), but how can they 
be, reliably? Second, there is the endemic problem with studies of this kind (Kravis, and 
Lipsey, 1971 pp.42-43) that measure price differentials. Such studies reflect continuous 
disturbance and adjustment in dynamic markets (the forces of competition itself) at least as 
much as, and probably more than, the presence of restrictions — official or non-official — 
in the market. 
This problem is extreme in a study which seeks to measure price differences 
between Japanese products and imported products in the period 1985, and uses price 
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indices to project differentials in 1989, (a period over which there was a sharp 
appreciation of the Japanese currency and huge change in the structure of Japanese trade), 
the share of manufactured goods imports almost doubling during this period (Drysdale, 
1989). These elementary practical and analytical issues are also ignored in other studies 
which interpret price differentials as evidence of 'hidden' barriers to trade and relate these 
barriers to Japanese corporate practice (Kingman, 1991; Lawrence, 1993). 
Corporate structure and closed markets 
The idea that keiretsu corporate structures in Japan are associated with 'closed' 
Japanese markets has wide currency in American policy and business circles (ACTPN 
1993, USTR 1995; Bergsten and Noland, 1993). 
There are two elements in the idea. The first is that Japanese corporate 
organisational structures facilitate collusion and predatory pricing behaviour in Japanese 
markets and internationally. Cartels and collusive trade practices constitute barriers to 
entry and an 'unfair' impediment to trade. The second analytically separable element 
relates to the nature of inter-firm ties and relational transactions which appear to typify 
manufacturing assembly in Japan. Dore (1986, p. 248) makes the point: 'Imports penetrate 
into markets, and where there are no markets, only a network of established "customer 
relationships", it is hard for them to make headway'. An ancillary issue is the 
'exclusionary' system whereby intermediate and final products are distributed in the 
Japanese market. 
Monopolistic behaviour, were it distinctively prevalent, would certainly limit 
market access. And undoubtedly there are markets in Japan in which monopolistic 
behaviour is a concern, such as construction or glass (McMillan, 1990; Sazanami, Urata 
and Kawai, 1995). But the question is whether keiretsu corporate structures can be 
presumed synonymous with monopolistic behaviour as the first element in the idea that 
Japanese corporate structures serve to close markets suggests. 
Access to markets which are 'closed' because they are internalised through the 
vertical integration of firms (historically a common pattern in the United States) or 
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because they are characterised by long term contracting, relational dealings or 'partial' 
vertical integration (the pattern observed more commonly in Japan) is another matter 
altogether. How such market structures are ordered reflects the choice of firms in defining 
the boundaries of their operations (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Cheung, 1983; Williamson, 1985; Sheard, 
1993; Sheard 1994). It is not clear that there is a policy role in which competitive 
pressures encourage that this choice be made efficiently. Firms (both domestic and 
foreign) have a strategic interest in how other firms make the choice about the boundaries 
of their operations but government intervention in this area is more likely to reduce 
efficiency and welfare than to enhance it. 
Keiretsu may be associated with 'closure of markets' in the sense that the location 
and nature of transacting at the boundaries of intermediate product markets is 
endogenously determined in the organisation of industry; but this is a completely different 
sense of closure from its meaning in the context of trade policy where closure results from 
exogenously imposed trade barriers. 
In policy discussion the two elements in the idea that keiretsu corporate structures 
exclude foreign competition are routinely confused. There is also some confusion in the 
academic literature, especially that which relies on secondhand knowledge of the 
institutions and how they operate. The language of trade practices and competition policy 
— collusion, exclusionary practices, closed markets — is applied indiscriminately and 
inappropriately to both elements in the idea. The first step is to clarify the nature of 
keiretsu corporate structures to establish a sounder foundation for the analysis of their 
impact on access to the Japanese market. 
This is not so simple a task as it may seem. Others (Saxonhouse, 1993; Sheard, 
1994) have observed that, even in technical discourse, the term keiretsu is used loosely in 
Japan to describe a wide range of corporate affiliations and the corporate groups which 
they define. There is an endless literature in Japanese (Sheard, 1986) and a growing 
literature in English which helps to clarify the issues (Goto, A, 1982; Abbeglen and Stalk, 
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1985; Sheard, 1991; Saxonhouse, 1991; Gerlach, 1992; Fruin, 1992; Gibson and Roe, 
1993; Saxonhouse, 1993; Aoki, Patrick and Sheard, 1994; Sheard, 1994). 
Sheard (1994) distinguishes three kinds of keiretsu structures. The first — financial 
keiretsu — comprises corporate groups, each representative of a wide range of industrial 
sectors and associated through cross-shareholdings and financial transactions with one of 
Japan's major city (or commercial) banks. There are six main-bank corporate groups — 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuji (deriving from the prewar zaibatsu), Sanwa and 
Daiichi Kangyo (formed in the high growth period after the war). These keiretsu groups 
are linked through financing relationships with the main bank and other financial 
institutions, interlocking shareholdings, association with a general trading company, 
supply relationships, and membership in one or more 'presidents' clubs, which provide an 
opportunity for senior management to meet regularly. Only 8 percent of listed firms on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange belong to these clubs but the source used by Sheard (Keizai Chosa 
Kyokai, 1992) classifies 59 percent of non-financial firms listed on the exchange as being 
affiliated in some way with one or another of these main-bank groups. The average level 
of the intra-group shareholding of these groups is around 18 percent, so too is the average 
level of intra-group bank and insurance financing. On average only 9 percent of purchases 
and 8 percent of sales are with other group firms, although for the general trading 
companies intra-group business is as high as two thirds of total business (Sheard, 1994, 
pp. 8-9). Financial keiretsu are vertical structures, in the sense of the literature on 
industrial organisation. Main-bank and co-insurance networks resemble a partially 
internalised capital market and the vertical linkages prominent in vertical keiretsu in 
intermediate commodity markets. 
The second — vertical keiretsu — comprise large assembly and manufacturing 
firms and their networks of subsidiaries and affiliated suppliers upstream in the production 
chain. Toyota is typical in the automobile industry. Matsushita, Hitachi, and Toshiba are 
typical in the electrical goods industry. Sheard (1994, p.9) identifies 40 major 'pyramid-
style') keiretsu groups like this, each with an average of over 190 subsidiaries or 
associated companies (Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1991, p.54). One study of Toyota 
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affiliates identifies 168 first-tier suppliers with, in turn, 5437 indirect or second-tier 
suppliers and a further 41,702 lower level or third-tier suppliers (Fruin, 1992, p.271). 
Toyota's 41 most important direct suppliers and subcontractors, for example, accounted 
for 75 percent of total inputs in 1991. These firms are not totally dependent on Toyota, 
which on average held about 25 percent of their shares and accounted for around 43 
percent of their sales (Sheard, 1994, pp. 10-11, 44-45). 
The third — distribution keiretsu — also involves vertical ties, but downstream in 
the production and distribution process, not upstream as in the case of vertical keiretsu. 
Most large firms have some kind of distribution system. Affiliated dealer networks or 
chain store outlets are common in final goods markets. The nine Japanese passenger 
vehicle producers, for example, have almost 4,000 affiliated leaders and over 17,000 
outlets. In many cases the dealerships are exclusive, but producer-ownership links vary 
considerably. For intermediate products 'special agency contracts', management and other 
assistance to agents is common (Sheard, 1994, pp. 11-12). 
These three types of keiretsu structure are not mutually exclusive. As Sheard 
(1994, p. 13) points out, 'leading industrial firms in financial keiretsu are typically parent 
firms in their own supplier networks, distribution networks and subsidiary groups.' Clearly 
keiretsu membership cannot be defined on a single dimension and it is much more 
ambiguous even than this helpful taxonomy suggests. 
Saxonhouse (1993, p.37) draws attention to the variety of definitions of keiretsu 
and consistent classification systems available from Japanese sources. Dodwell Marketing 
Group, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, Toyo Keizai Shimposha, Keizai Chosa Kyokai are four 
of the most prominent sources and data from these sources can differ widely. Weinstein 
and Yafeh (1993) show that none of the five most commonly used definitions are closely 
correlated (the highest coefficient being 0.32) and Saxonhouse (1993, p.37) points out 
that classifications change arbitrarily even in the one source year by year. The Dodwell 
Marketing Group classification, on which Lawrence (1991a) bases his work, lists 9 
vertical keiretsu in 1986, but three years later the number jumps to 33. Arbitrary 
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classification is obviously a product of different understandings of the nature of keiretsu 
and muddies analysis of their role in the operation of the Japanese economy. 
On top of the problem of the classification of keiretsu structures, Japanese firms 
consistently change their corporate affiliations, much more frequently than is generally 
understood. Horiuchi, Packer and Fukuda (1988) report that more than 25 percent of 
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange changed their main-bank or financial keiretsu 
affiliation between the 1970s and 1980s. Keiretsu corporate structures are clearly a more 
plastic economic variable than many research analysts and most policy commentators 
realise. 
However, suppose that keiretsu affiliations can be described unambiguously in the 
three dimensions set out by Sheard (1994). At least at one point in time, using the one 
data source (Sheard chose Keizai Chosa Kyokai) this is practicable. What are their 
implications for access to the Japanese market? Do Japanese financial keiretsu allow more 
monopoly power in Japanese manufacturing activity than there is in American or European 
manufacturing, and does this consequently limit foreign access to the Japanese market, 
thereby affecting the welfare of Japanese consumers and international producers in a way 
that distinguishes corporate behaviour in Japanese markets from that in other industrial 
countries? Does the presence of vertical keiretsu lead to exclusion of competitive foreign 
suppliers from the Japanese market for manufactures? Does the prevalence of distribution 
keiretsu lock out competition in final or intermediate goods markets? 
Financial keiretsu and competition 
The suggestion that financial keiretsu are harbingers of monopoly power to a 
peculiar extent can be dispatched quickly. As the literature on industrial organisation 
makes clear (Jacquemin and Slade, 1989; Tirole, 1988), cartels or anti-competitive and 
collusive practices involve price-fixing or coordination in the same product markets. Firms 
in Japanese financial keiretsu (and, for that matter in vertical or distribution keiretsu) 
cannot collude or form cartels by virtue simply of their keiretsu affiliations because 
keiretsu firms from the same group do not operate in the same product market. Financial 
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keiretsu are sometimes described as 'horizontal' structures, but they are not in the sense in 
which the term horizontal (as in 'horizontal merger') is used in the literature on industrial 
organisation. They are horizontal structures only in the sense in that they involve 
operations in different product markets across a whole range of corporate activities. This 
is the 'one-set' phenomenon identified by Miyazaki (1967). 
The fact that there are six major financial keiretsu in Japan, it might reasonably be 
argued, intensifies competition in different product markets rather than reduces it. 
Participation in most markets is high and the threat and ease of entry great. These keiretsu 
groups, as well as independent firms, are players in most important markets which are 
consequently less concentrated than markets in many other industrial countries. Moreover, 
the trading companies, which are a mainstay of financial keiretsu, are very competitive and 
active in each other's markets. There are particular markets characterised by a large 
degree of concentration and monopoly or oligopolistic behaviour in Japan and it is also 
theoretically conceivable, but not practically credible (Sheard, 1994, pp.7-18), that 
keiretsu groups may facilitate multi-market collusion (Tirole, 1988). But most studies of 
market concentration across industrial countries do not reveal Japan as an outlier (Caves 
and Uekusa, 1976). Indeed, for most sectors, market concentration is relatively low in 
Japanese manufacturing. There are nine automobile producers in Japan in contrast to the 
big three in the United States, and while concentration ratios have limited value as an 
indicator of competition in product markets, the Japanese automobile industry, for 
example, appears intensely competitive (Smitka, 1991). 
Sheard (1994, p. 16) exposes the confusion in the literature on keiretsu, 
competition and market access in Lawrence's influential study (1991a). Lawrence 
concludes (p.329): 
While antitrust motivations should be punished, there are cases where keiretsu 
relationships improve efficiency. As might be expected, these efficiencies tend to 
be associated with vertical rather than horizontal linkages. Given the complexity 
and pervasiveness of vertical keiretsu, it is difficult to support extreme approaches 
that would either entirely ban these linkages or outwardly tolerate them. Instead 
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vigilance and a "rule of reason" approach, which pays a particular attention to 
horizontal linkages, seems more appropriate. 
The horizontal linkages Lawrence has in his sights here, as Sheard points out, have 
nothing to do with monopoly potential, but are cross-market, rather than within-market, 
conglomerate-like structures involving vertical linkages in the sense of the literature on 
industrial organisation. Financial keiretsu do not offer scope in themselves for collusion 
and exclusionary market practices in the way that policy discussion and policy-driven 
academic discussion suggests. 
Vertical keiretsu and market access 
Most of the political rhetoric and policy energy surrounding the keiretsu issue 
focuses on the way in which vertical keiretsu are said to discriminate against 'outsiders'. 
There is a large number of anecdotes from journalists, businessmen and politicians about 
'cosy relationships' between upstream and downstream producers in almost every part of 
manufacturing. These anecdotes are about discriminatory or preferential vertical 
relationships in the market for intermediate goods and supplies. 
There are two puzzles about the claim that long term contracting in vertical 
keiretsu discriminates against competitive foreign suppliers of intermediate products in 
Japanese manufacturing. The first has to do with why Japanese assembly firms, like 
automobile manufacturers, would wish to handicap themselves by maintaining inefficient 
suppliers when they have to operate in a competitive international final product market. In 
the industrial organisation literature, this observation relates to the 'rule of reason' that 
vertical relationships are acceptable provided that the relationships are formed in 
contestable markets. This does not mean that such markets adjust immediately to new 
competitive pressures. Indeed, such corporate dealings may contain a conservative bias, 
delaying the emergence of intermediate goods imports beyond the time when they initially 
appear to have become competitive (Drysdale, 1969; Saxonhouse, 1988, p. 234; Drysdale 
and Garnaut, 1993). But such lags in the process of market adjustment are not unique to 
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Japanese corporate structures. It took several years for German and Japanese steel 
producers to sell their cheaper steel to General Motors in the United States after American 
steel became uncompetitive (Drysdale, 1989). As Cooper's (1975) study of North 
American markets for metals in the 1970s shows us, the lagged response to relative price 
change is an appropriate response in dynamic and competitive markets. Long term 
contracting has a similar effect in the Australian resource trade (Smith, 1979). 
The second puzzle is why vertical relationships — which would attract no 
attention in trade practice law and policy if they were conducted within fully integrated 
corporate operations — are an object of policy interest if practiced between two firms that 
are not fully integrated. General Motors' purchases 25 percent of its imports from outside 
suppliers, compared with Toyota's outside purchases of some 75 percent (Aoki, 1986). 
Why, asks Saxonhouse (1993, p.38), is formal vertical integration in the United States 
better (or fairer) than informal integration in Japan? In fact, it may be less efficient as well 
as no fairer, as trends in North America in the last decade or so seem to confirm (Smitka, 
1991; Smitka 1993). Dyer (1993) provides data suggesting that Japanese automobile parts 
markets are as open to arms-length supply as those in the United States. As Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1993) demonstrate, the higher the proportion of keiretsu firms in a Japanese 
industry, the lower the price-cost margins, a phenomenon consistent with intense 
competition among keiretsu groups. 
There is an extensive analytical literature on discriminatory vertical relationships in 
industrial organisation (Perry, 1989). The findings in the literature support skepticism 
about such relationships being instruments of collusive behaviour: as Sheard (1994) 
observes, what to outsiders may appear as 'cosy relationships' may be characterised 
alternatively as 'value adding partnerships' (Johnston and Wallace, 1988). 
The central question is whether vertical keiretsu are plausibly cast as instruments 
of market foreclosure, where a firm at one stage of production 'closes off' another stage 
of production to its rivals (Sheard, 1993; Sheard, 1994): 
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Vertical foreclosure can take two forms, depending on whether the 
purchasing firm is upstream or downstream. Downstream foreclosure occurs 
when an upstream firm enters into contracts with downstream firms with the 
aim of shutting out other upstream firms from the output market (the 
downstream input market). Upstream foreclosure occurs when a 
downstream firm enters into contracts with upstream firms with the aim of 
disadvantaging other downstream firms in its output market by raising the 
costs of supply of inputs <= a traditional concern in the anti-trust literature 
involves the case of a downstream monopolist foreclosing entry to its market 
by denying the potential entrant access to an essential input that it controls 
(Sheard, 1994, p.24). 
The concern about foreclosure through vertical keiretsu would be relevant, as 
Sheard (1994) also points out, only under very unlikely circumstances. Downstream 
foreclosure would require, for example, that suppliers of inputs like steel or glass in the 
automobile industry tried to exercise market power by locking up downstream automobile 
producers' input markets against other suppliers of steel or glass, domestic or foreign. It is 
hardly probable that it will be in the interests of automobile manufacturers to allow 
upstream firms to monopolise their input markets, potentially raising their costs and 
lowering quality and competitiveness. Technically, this is not a Nash equilibrium and so is 
an unlikely outcome — parties to this type of agreement have incentives not to abide by it. 
The other possibility is upstream foreclosure by Japanese automobile manufacturers. This 
strategy would aim at excluding rivals from supply networks, but the issue of Toyota or 
other Japanese auto-makers denying American makers access to their affiliated suppliers 
so that American maakers are disadvantaged is not an issue that is really on the agenda. 
Firms enter into long term contracts in competitive markets because they generate 
value — lowering costs, improving quality, securing supply channels — through doing so. 
The way in which a firm organises its input purchases is an important choice in a market 
economy. It is one of the decisions to be made about using corporate resources and 
strategic opportunities. Manufacturers compete with one another more or less successfully 
in this dimension as in others. To represent this process in terms of closure of markets is 
misleading. 
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The distribution system 
The arguments about the way in which the Japanese distribution system limits 
access to the Japanese market may have more substance. Yet, here too, it is important to 
distinguish the effect of distribution keiretsu from other factors affecting access in final 
goods markets. 
The analysis of potential foreclosure in the distribution of final or intermediate 
products is analogous to the case of intermediate product markets: if 'distribution' is seen 
as another kind of input used in delivering output. From this perspective, the distribution 
system presents an opportunity for upstream foreclosure by Japanese manufacturers using 
distribution channels to disadvantage domestic and foreign competitors by denying them 
access to a needed input. This is the essence of the United States complaint about 
restraints in marketing American automobiles in Japan. 
Because distribution has many of the characteristics of a non-traded good — at 
least some of the inputs must be acquired locally — there may appear a special 
opportunity for foreclosure in this market. However, the conditions under which 
foreclosure will succeed are strict in theory (Hart and Tirole, 1990) and remote in practice 
(Sheard, 1994, pp. 27-28). There is always the option of a firms mobilising its own 
distribution facilities — presuming the right of establishment and entry. If the right of 
establishment and entry is denied, that is likely a problem of the regulatory system, not a 
problem of the corporate structures involved. 
Moreover, and more tellingly, downstream firms will have an incentive to enter 
contracts with upstream suppliers of final products only if such contracts lower their costs, 
or enforce quality in delivery, and only so long as other upstream suppliers (including 
those from abroad) cannot supply a competitive alternative. 
In the automobile market, this circumstance will be recognised by Australian 
readers familiar with the entry of Japanese suppliers into the Australian passenger vehicle 
markets in the 1960s and 1970s. As the competitiveness of Japanese automobiles was 
established, exclusive dealerships for the products of American owned firms crumbled, but 
only after a time. 
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There are other more important reasons why American trade negotiators put much 
effort into opening up Japan's distribution system. Regulatory controls, not distribution 
keiretsu, limit outlets and increase distribution costs for a range of products both domestic 
and foreign. Hence, reform of Japan's Large Scale Retail Store Law was an important 
target in the Structural Impediments Initiative negotiations (Terada, 1994). The effect of 
these regulatory controls is formidable and embedded in social structures (such as the 
appeal of 'mom and pop stores' in retailing) so that inertia to reform and change may be 
great. 
An Australian connection 
Australian policymakers and corporations with extensive dealings in Japan are 
knowledgeable about the restrictions and regulatory systems that affect access to the 
Japanese market, especially over a wide range of the agricultural and services trades. 
Australia is not a leading exporter of manufactures to Japan, although Japan is Australia's 
second largest single export market for manufactured goods after New Zealand (APEG, 
1995). New entrants to the Japanese market, for example, manufacturers of vehicle 
components, are familiar with the time-consuming processes involved in establishing a 
beachhead and market share.4 But, significantly, the issues of corporate behaviour and 
practice reviewed in this paper have not been conspicuous in Australian business or policy 
discussion of access to the Japanese market. 
Yet, oddly, there is an important Australian connection in the literature. The 
purchasing behaviour of Japanese firms in Australia has been cited prominently to 
substantiate the claim that Japanese practices are exclusionary, limiting access by 
foreign suppliers to Japanese companies at home and abroad (Lawrence, 1991b, p.21).5 
4One Australian manufacturer of components for the vehicle industry reported to me a requirement that 
his consignment to Japanese agents be delivered in non-branded packaging so as to disguise the switch in 
purchases by assemblers (Interview, Sydney, 1994). 
5
 The material in this section is drawn from Drysdale, 1993. 
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The principal evidence on this matter is presented in a survey by Kreinin (1989) 
of sixty-two companies in Australia, of which twenty were Japanese, twenty-two were 
American, and twenty were European. On the basis of responses to his questioning, he 
suggests that Japanese subsidiaries in Australia 'are highly controlled by the respective 
parent company, procure their equipment mainly from Japan and use and operate 
mainly Japanese machinery' (Kreinin, 1989, p.540). Kreinin's conclusion is very 
strong and his interpretation of his findings unequivocally links this behaviour to 
peculiar Japanese corporate practice. His work is cited widely in policy circles in the 
United States and provided early credence to the notion that keiretsu corporate 
structures constituted a major 'hidden' barrier in accessing the Japanese home market.6 
Yet his questionnaire appears open-ended, there is no summary statistical reporting of 
his findings whereby it is easy to assess his impression of the evidence, and he makes 
no comparison between his findings and those of others, including the regular surveys 
by responsible Japanese and American agencies. 
Kreinin reports that in fifteen out of twenty Japanese companies surveyed, either 
all or over 80 percent of the equipment was of Japanese origin (p.535). Only five firms 
used international competitive bids for purchasing standardised equipment, compared 
with twenty-one of the twenty-two American-owned subsidiaries for machinery or 
materials not available for Australia. He did note that a few Japanese firms intended to 
move to open tendering but this observation did not qualify the interpretation of his 
findings. Kreinin's study of Japanese foreign direct investment in Australia is 
consistent with the general impression of Japanese corporate use of its own suppliers of 
parts and components in Japanese investments elsewhere, in North America and East 
Asia. 
6Kreinen's study is cited as justification for import targeting policy strategies by American officials 
(Interview, USTR, December 1990). 
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There is a valuable reference point to Kreinin's work and general impressions in 
the classic study of American investment in Australia by Brash (1966). Brash undertook 
a careful survey of the sales and purchasing of American investors in Australia in 1962. 
Interestingly, Kreinin appears unaware of Brash's earlier study or its relevance to his 
own work. 
Brash's work reveals that American subsidiaries he surveyed were unlikely to 
purchase equipment or components from Australian suppliers, even if they were 
cheaper than equipment and materials sourced from affiliated or parent companies 
(pp.203-211). Most of the imports of American-owned companies were purchased 
from or through American affiliated firms with wholly owned firms having a higher 
dependence on imports than joint ventures. Significantly, Brash's data (p. 205) suggest 
that the more recently established American subsidiaries imported a much higher 
proportion of their equipment and material requirements than older established firms. 
Measured as a proportion of total sales (rather than purchases, for which data was not 
readily available), the import ratio for all firms was 18.7 percent, but for firms 
established in the previous five years it was 29.5 percent. 
On the basis of both the impressionistic and the more comprehensive statistical 
evidence that Brash provides on American subsidiary purchasing behaviour in 
Australia, it would seem difficult to conclude that Japanese firms differ significantly in 
this respect from their American counterparts. There is, in fact, a deal of published 
quantitative evidence that can be turned to analysing the purchasing behaviour of 
Japanese and, to a lesser extent, American subsidiaries in Australia. I have reviewed 
this evidence in some detail elsewhere (Drysdale, 1993, pp. 33-34).7 
It is clear from this evidence that Japanese subsidiaries imported a higher 
proportion of intermediate goods and equipment from the home country than their 
7A recent study by Nicholas (1995) provides a rich new source of data on the characteristics and 
behaviour of Japanese affiliates in Australia. 
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American counterparts in the 1980s. It is also clear that there was a significant change 
in the pattern through the decade. Imports from Japan were consistently and 
significantly declining as a proportion of intermediate goods purchases over these 
years. Whatever drives this pattern of purchases, it is not a permanent feature of 
Japanese corporate behaviour. 
Kreinin's findings can be explained rather on grounds that have little to do with 
discriminatory or exclusionary practices by Japanese firms or keiretsu corporate 
structures (Saxonhouse, 1991). Most Japanese manufacturing operations in Australia are 
of recent origin. The bulk of these investments in the past were designed to produce 
substitutes for products that were previously imported to Australia from Japan. Japan 
continues to have a strong comparative advantage in what Japanese affiliates in these 
sectors are producing in Australia (in automobiles, for example). By contrast, most of the 
American and European firms with which Kreinin makes comparison are decades old, 
producing goods in which the home country has lost much of its comparative advantage. 
It is hardly surprising that the sourcing pattern of Japanese manufacturing firms in 
Australia is as it is. This has historically been typical also of the sourcing patterns of 
American manufacturing firms in Australia. The evidence reinforces Saxonhouse's 
observation that Kreinin's Australian study is entirely consistent with the histories of 
multinational corporations more generally (Wilkins, 1975; Chen and Drysdale, 1995). It 
does not suggest distinctive Japanese trade practices. This issue is endemic in the 
experience of multinational corporations and host countries as is attested to by the 
prevalence of local content requirements in the national regulation of direct foreign 
investment throughout the world. 
Implications for policy 
This paper set out to explore how market structure and different corporate 
organisational forms might affect access to the Japanese market for manufactured goods. 
The argument that keiretsu corporate structures in Japan are collusive and exclusionary 
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has been used to justify American trade policy strategies, such as calling for import targets 
in Japanese markets for manufactured goods, which would treat Japan differently from 
other industrial countries and seek to manage trade flows in ways which are not consistent 
with the principles to which GATT has appealed in the past and which are embodied in the 
WTO. 
This is no trivial issue. American trade policymakers pushed this argument strongly 
in the recent attempt to 'open' Japanese automobile and automobile parts markets. 
Significantly, there was widespread unease in international policy circles about this 
American trade policy approach. This paper provides argument which reinforces this 
unease. 
Keiretsu corporate structures are not accurately characterised as 'collusive', 
'cartel-like', 'anti-competitive' or 'exclusionary' in the antitrust sense of the term8. 
Financial keiretsu are more likely to increase competition in final product markets than 
they are to reduce it, other things being equal. Vertical keiretsu reflect efficient relational 
dealings in intermediate product markets rather than restrictive trade practices. Even in the 
case of distribution keiretsu, an area of more concern on the surface of it, vertical 
foreclosure is not the main issue. The main issue is regulatory controls which inhibit or 
facilitate entry to final product markets, and they are the relevant target of policy 
attention. 
The argument for trade policy strategies which seek to break down 
'hidden barriers' to trade, resulting from keiretsu corporate structures, through the 
imposition of import targets and managed trade arrangements is intellectually flawed — 
built on loose logic and incomplete information about the nature of the institutional 
arrangements which are the object of policy. If Japanese policymakers had yielded to this 
argument, Japan would, incidentally, have signed on to a policy of re-regulation against 
8As Sheard (1994, p.32) points out, the notion of 'exclusion' as an aspect of long term contracting 
or the dynamics of repeated transactions needs to be carefully distinguished from 'exclusion' in the 
context of antitrust. 
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the thrust of domestic and international interest in Japan's liberalisation and economic 
reform agenda. 
This is not, of course, to suggest that there are not problems of access to the 
Japanese market for manufactured goods. In some industries, industry associations 
provide a potential vehicle for collective practices. Regulatory systems impact on these 
markets, as they do on other markets in Japan, such as in the agricultural and services 
sectors. However, the direct effect of regulatory systems on manufactured goods markets 
is circumscribed. For example, in the case of automobile product markets, American 
negotiators focused attention on Japan's motor vehicle inspection system {shaken) as a 
restraint on import trade. The inspection agency arrangements effectively cut suppliers of 
imported parts out of the market. This provides ground for legitimate complaint and is 
accepted as such by Japanese negotiators. These regulations affect foreign supplier access 
and the welfare of Japanese consumers. In the Section 301 move on the automobile 
products trade against Japan, American officials (Kantor, 1995a) were careful to confine 
the formal complaint, which triggered action, largely to the issue of the so-called 'after-
parts' market for automobile products. But this market is tiny in relation to the entire 
automobile products market, control over which was more broadly and publicly contested 
between Japan and the United States (Kantor, 1995b; Clinton, 1995). 
Here, there is not the space to analyse developments in trans-Pacific automobile 
products trade in detail. Suffice it to observe that this market will undergo further rapid 
charge over the next decade, as it has over the past decade; that there will be a significant 
increase in Japan's intra-industry trade, as the competitiveness of manufacturing 
automobiles in Japan peaks and Japanese firms adjust to the new competitive 
circumstances of their operations in Japan, North America and elsewhere; and that these 
changes will be largely driven by competitive forces in the market, not by policy posture in 
North America. 
Markets that appear closed to new entrants because of keiretsu corporate ties are 
markets that need to be opened by business, not government negotiators. Japanese firms 
have no sensible interest in sheltering their suppliers from foreign competition. They do 
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not need Japanese or US government officials to guide them to make cost-minimising 
import purchase decisions. There may be good reasons to increase foreign access to the 
Japanese market. The justification for these actions, however, must lie in other than the 
anti-competitive and market foreclosure rhetoric in which it is clothed (Sheard, 1994, 
p.41). 
It needs to be added, nonetheless, that the threat of reprisals and aggressive 
unilateral trade policy action by the United States can have impact, however flawed its 
intellectual foundations. Australian exports of vehicles and components to Japan have 
been stagnant over the past year while imports from other sources in Europe, and even 
North America, have grown.9 This may be simply a product of the structure of import 
adjustment during a deep recession. On the other hand, it could also be related to the 
gathering threat of American trade action. Detailed analysis is needed to assess whether 
American trade policy threats affected procurement strategies by the Japanese industry 
over this period and what effect they might have in the future. There is enough 
circumstantial evidence to warrant active research interest in this area. 
Japanese imports of Australian-made motor vehicles and components fell by 8 percent between April 
1994 and March 1995, while imports from the United States grew by 53 percent. Imports from all sources 
grew by 35 percent. Imports of Australian-made components fell by 13 percent, while imports of 
American-made components increased by 22 percent. Australia's exports of motor vehicle parts and 
components to Japan were $A207.4 million in 1994, in total exports of these products of $A1.54 billion. 
(Data on imports of automobile products into Japan are from Nikkei Telecom Database, Australia-Japan 
Research Centre, and data on Australian exports are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.) 
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